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Abstract--This paper discusses that there is significant 
benefit in providing stronger security at lower layers of 
the network stack for hosts connected to a network. It 
claims to reduce the attack vulnerability of a networked 
host by providing security mechanisms in a programmable 
Network Interface Card (NIC). Dynamic access control 
mechanisms are implemented in hardware to restrict 
access to the services provided, only to authenticated hosts. 
This reduces server vulnerability to various layer 2 
attacks. Also the services will be immune to zero-day 
vulnerabilities due to the minimal code execution paths.  
To this end, it presents architecture and implementation 
details of a programmable network interface card 
equipped with these measures. It works alongside, and 
augments, existing security protocols making deployment 
practical. 
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 I INTRODUCTION 
 
Network security has become a concern with the rapid growth 
of the Internet.  It plays one of the key roles in the network 
infrastructure of an organization. Although a lot of research 
has been carried out to provide security in application, 
transport and network layers [1, 2, 3], the importance of 
security in data link layer is still underestimated. Traditional 
approaches to network security are not found to be effective in 
local area networks (LANs). A data link layer communication 
is a weak link in terms of network security. Since a system is 
only as strong as it’s weakest link, a compromise at this level 
will invalidate the other levels of security. A Denial of Service 
(DoS) [4] attack using ARP cache poisoning [5] can render a 
server useless even if it provides other forms of security. 
Thus, the security measures at the data link layer are 
complementary to the other measures that are used to provide 
extra protection of the network and users.   
 
Another appealing factor about data link layer security is that 
it can conceal the vulnerabilities present in the upper layers to 
the outside world.  One of the major difficulties in protecting 
networked machines is because of the vulnerabilities present 
in the operating system and services running in the host. A 
number of exploit releases, worms and vulnerability 
disclosures [6, 7, 8, 9] allow an attacker to exploit them to get 
access into the system. Although secure code writing practices 
are followed these days, the vicious ‘exploit-disclosure-patch’ 
cycle seems to be unavoidable. Hardening the system [10] by 
restricting the number of open ports and avoiding information 
leakage are only temporary solutions, since the open ports too 
can have vulnerabilities. Moreover the operating system 
which includes the network stack is not devoid of 
vulnerabilities.  
 
This paper considers the security challenges in IP over 
Ethernet networks because of their predominance. Ethernet 
provides a low-cost, high-speed, general purpose 
communication interface. It is now standardized by IEEE [11] 
and is available in various data rates. Although Ethernet is 
considered the concepts proposed are general. 
 
In this paper we propose a network security model that 
eliminates the various data link layer security issues and also 
reduces the attack vulnerability of a network server. We 
propose to apply necessary security measures in the network 
interface devices. We describe the implementation details 
using a Programmable Network Interface Card based on Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).  
 
This paper is organized as follows. We begin with the 
problems considered in Section 2. The architecture and its 
FPGA based implementation are discussed in Section 3 and 4, 
respectively. Related work is described in Section 5 Summary 
of the contributions and conclusions are presented in section 
6. 
 
II NETWORK SECURITY 
 
Weakness in data link layer coupled with programming flaws 
in the networking software form the fundamental problems in 
network security.   
 
A. Data Link Layer Attacks 
 
An Ethernet network has many security weaknesses that can 
be used to launch attacks from inside or outside the network.  
Attacks that are targeted towards end systems exploit the 
disadvantages of Ethernet which are discussed in [12]. The 
primary weakness with Ethernet is that it is a broadcast 
system. Every message reaches all parts of the LAN and can 
be read by any host on the network. This allows an attacker to 
passively eavesdrop packets going through the network. Also, 
Ethernet does not provide any mechanism to authenticate the 
senders’ identity. This allows an attacker to generate spoofed 
packets or to replay earlier eavesdropped packets.  
 
Most commonly known attacks against end hosts IP over 
Ethernet networks are based on Medium Access Control 
(MAC) Address spoofing or Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) poisoning.  MAC spoofing attacks involve the use of a 
known MAC address of another host to attempt to make the 
target switch forward frames destined for the remote host to 
the network attacker. By sending a single frame with the other 
host's source Ethernet address, the network attacker overwrites 
the table entry so that the switch forwards packets destined for 
the host to the network attacker. Until the host sends traffic it 
will not receive any traffic. When the host sends out traffic, 
the table entry is rewritten once more so that it moves back to 
the original port. 
 
ARP Poisoning attack exploits the weakness in the design of 
ARP. ARP [13] is a protocol that provides the mapping 
between the 32 bit IP address and the 48 bit Ethernet address. 
An ARP request packet is broadcasted whenever a host needs 
to send an IP datagram as an Ethernet frame for the first time. 
Host with the matching IP address replies by a unicast packet 
to the sender of the request with the <IP, MAC> pairs. To 
minimize the number of requests sent on the network every 
host maintains a table of <IP, MAC> pairs, called the ARP 
cache. This table is filled based on the replies received and the 
entries have an expiration time.  Since ARP is a stateless 
protocol; a reply is processed even though the corresponding 
request was never transmitted. This allows an attacker to 
easily change the <IP, MAC> association contained in a host 
ARP cache by forging an ARP reply packet. This forms the 
basis of many attacks like the DoS and Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) [5].  
 
B. Software Vulnerabilities 
 
The security of a system depends on a wide variety of 
configuration elements both at the operating system level and 
the application level. As the old saying goes, “The devil is in 
the details.”  Software services and the operating system are 
nearly infinitely configurable, and subtle configuration 
changes can have significant security implications. Thus, 
some security exposures and vulnerabilities are not always 
immediately obvious, and a lack of understanding about the 
impact of changing configuration elements can lead to 
unintentional exposures. 
 
Furthermore, security on operating systems never stays static. 
Once secured, a system does not perpetually stay secure. 
Indeed, the longer one uses the system, the less secure it 
becomes. This can happen through operational or functional 
changes exposing the system to threats or through new 
exploits being discovered in packages and applications. 
Securing a system thus becomes an ongoing and living 
process.  
 
C. Current Solutions 
 
Established techniques to protect Internet-connected machines 
tend to rely either on filtering packets, or on application-level 
security. The first technique is implemented by firewalls, 
Internet-connected devices running software whose job is to 
filter or log unwanted network traffic. However, there are 
common attacks against which a firewall cannot protect. For 
example, firewalls do not protect against attempts to exploit 
bugs in application-level software. Such vulnerabilities occur 
because the Internet architecture assumes that services bound 
to a port should be accessible by any machine using the 
Internet protocols. 
 
The second technique is to deploy high-strength application-
level security mechanisms. However, authenticated services 
are built above the network layer and are often themselves 
subject to attack once discovered on a host. Reliance solely on 
application-level security exposes the problem of the 
computational expense of such security mechanisms. The high 
computational burden of commonly deployed cryptographic 
schemes leaves the server open to computational DoS attacks. 
Furthermore, complex schemes are error prone, as exemplified 
by the integer overflow bug in SSH which has been the target 
of many attacks [14]. 
   
D. Attack Surface 
 
Recent trend [15, 16] towards mitigating security risks by 
minimizing the code you expose to the untrusted users has 
been gaining popularity. This philosophy is called Attack 
Surface Reduction (ASR). The attack surface of an app is the 
union of code, interfaces, services, protocols, and practices 
available to all users, with a strong focus on what is accessible 
to unauthenticated users. The core tenet of ASR is that all 
code has a nonzero likelihood of containing one or more 
vulnerabilities. Some vulnerabilities will result in system 
compromise. Therefore, the only way to ensure no system 
compromises is to reduce code usage to zero. ASR is a 
compromise between perfect safety and unmitigated risk that 
minimizes code exposed to untrusted users. Methods like Port 
Knocking and Single Packet Authentication (SPA)  [17] are 
based on this concept.  Port knocking’s primary aim is to 
provide an extra layer of protection through the use of 
authentication with the added benefit of service cloaking. SPA 
retains all of the benefits of port knocking, but fixes the 
limitations of the latter by providing a stronger authentication 
mechanism. 
 
Although both these methods  allow administrators to keep the 
(potentially vulnerable) service hidden from the public, whilst 
making it available to authorized users, these share the 
problem that a stack access is required for the implementation 
to work. I.e. they rely on the services provided by the 
operating system, which may contain flaws. 
  
 
III ARCHITECTURE 
 
A.Overview 
 
The doctrine for setting up a secure network server, reflects on 
the core concepts discussed in the earlier section: service 
cloaking and authentication. The networked host should be 
minimalist in design i.e. only required services should be run 
and access to these services should only be provided to 
authenticated hosts. And this should be provided in a secure 
way without depending on other vulnerable software. One 
way of implementing this is to apply these security 
mechanisms in the network interface card itself thereby 
making it independent of OS and applications. This will not 
only secure the host from data link attacks but also will cover 
the applications running above it.  
Thus, the requirements for protecting the host and the services 
running on it can be listed down as follows  
 
• The services running on the machine should be 
hidden for normal hosts. This allows host server to 
attempt to be invisible to other Internet connected 
machines while still providing service to authorized 
parties. 
 
• Only authorized source with valid credentials should 
be able to access the services. The authorization 
mechanism should be easy to validate, yet difficult to 
forge. For the service to remain hidden, this stage 
should elicit no response if the credentials are 
invalid. 
 
• Full-strength application-specific security 
mechanisms can be used to augment the above 
mechanisms to provide true end-to-end encryption.  
 
The benefits brought out from these schemes are:  
 
• Reduced opportunity for attack attempts -  since 
attacks are less likely to be attempted on machines 
which do not appear to be running any services; 
• Reduced vulnerability to attacks-  since an attacker 
must circumvent our scheme before proceeding with 
the attack;  
• Reduced cost (in terms of processing time and 
resources) of rejecting attackers-  since large fraction 
of packets are discarded at the interface itself, freeing 
the operating system of these procedures  
• Immunity to data link attacks based on ARP 
poisoning- Since ARP is updated only after 
verification of the knock, any attempt to poison the 
ARP cache gets invalidated. 
 
B. Authentication 
 
Authentication is provided in the form of “Knock” sequences 
embedded in the packets. The packets contain the IP address 
and port number of the sender. The contents of the packet are 
encrypted using a shared key. This prevents any third party 
from extracting the IP address and port number of the sender, 
thereby disabling him from launching spoofing based attacks. 
The knock sequences are carried in ICMP packet which will 
allow external trusted hosts to use this mechanism.  
The sequence of operations involved in establishing a secure 
connection is shown in Figure 1. 
The sender first gets the MAC address of the server using 
normal ARP protocol. The reply in this case is not generated 
by the network stack of the server. An ARP Processor in the 
card performs this operation in stateless manner. This 
mechanism is explained in detail in Section 4. After receiving 
the MAC address the clients interface card generates a Knock 
packet. This is validated by the servers NIC and dynamically 
adds a filter table entry in the NIC, which will allow packet 
belonging to this particular transaction to reach the server 
 
Figure 1. Packet Sequence 
 
process. Since the IP address and port number that is opened 
is known only to the client and server (since the packet is 
encrypted), replay attacks are avoided. Once the filter rules are 
enabled, the client can carry on with the transaction. Detailed 
sequence of operation is depicted in Figure 2. The 
implementation details are provided in Section 4 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of operations 
 
C. Service cloaking  
Recent research [15, 16] has shown that rather than trying to 
minimize the ‘exploit-disclosure-patch’ cycle, a system’s 
security can be ‘virtually’ increased via ‘security through 
concealment’ method. This method has the added benefit that 
the protected machines have a greater immunity against zero-
day exploits. The crux of the idea is to minimize the Code 
Execution Paths (CEP), which is made visible by a system. 
Security measures like port knocking and Single Packet 
Authentication (SPA) are based on this model. Although the 
above methods are efficient enough in hiding the services, 
they too depend on the operating systems APIs. This makes 
them vulnerable to various exploits. For example both Port 
Knocking and Single Packet Authentication make use of 
NetFilter  to deny the packets. Recent vulnerabilities found in 
the NetFilter implementation in Linux 2.6 kernels allow a 
remote host to hang a system running these versions of the 
software. By lowering the security mechanisms to a lower 
layer prevents these flaws. Figure 3 a,b,c compares the Code 
Execution Paths in various security implementations.  
 
 
 
     
The architecture also facilitates optional encryption of packet.  
The principal reason for not enforcing encryption is to allow 
network administrators and network devices (intrusion 
detection systems, anti-virus etc.) to look into the packets 
flowing in their network. This information is generally used to 
characterize the traffic to streamline the traffic flow across the 
network devices. Users, who still require a secure channel, can 
use any of the upper layer securities like IPsec or TLS.  
 
IV IMPLEMENATATION 
 
A. Overview 
 
The card is designed in house as a PCI add-on board. It 
consists of an Altera CycloneII (EP2C672C7) FPGA (Figure 
4). The Ethernet interfaces are provided through a pair of 
 Figure 3a:  
CEP for 
application 
layer security  
 Figure 3b:  
CEP for 
network layer 
security  
 Figure 3c:  
CEP for data 
link layer 
security  
LXT972 transceivers. The LXT972 is an IEEE compliant Fast 
Ethernet PHY Transceiver that directly supports both 
100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T applications. It provides a 
Media Independent Interface (MII) for easy attachment to 
10/100 Media Access Controllers (MACs). This interface is 
provided to the FPGA for Tx and Rx. Host connectivity is 
provided through a 32 bit 33 MHz PCI interface. The limit 
switches enable the card to work with 5v and 3.3v PCI 
connectors. The card also has external memory in the form of 
SDRAM (MT48LCM32B2). The SDRAM controller is a soft 
IP interfaces with the Avalon internal bus.  
  
 
 
Figure 4. Card view 
 
The Figure 5 shows the architecture of the firmware.  A 
transceiver interface is used as a wrapper for the Ethernet Tx 
and Rx operation to the PHY device. The major modules 
include Data Path Processor, Authentication Processor, ARP 
Processor, Packet Filter and Host Interface. A set of 
asynchronous FIFOs are used to interface the PHY device. 
The FIFOs are 8bit wide and can store 2 maximum size 
Ethernet packets. These modules are further described below: 
 
B. Data Path Processor 
 
The Data Path Processor is implemented using the Nios II 
softcore processor. It is responsible for the overall control of 
the card. During transmission it generates the knock packet. It 
also processes the received knock packet. The MAC address 
of the validated knock along with the source IP obtained from 
the knock is provided to the host through the host interface for 
ARP cache updation. It also configures the filter table using 
the parameters obtained from the validated knock. 
 
C. Authentication Processor 
 
The Authentication Processor’s job is to validate the knock 
packet that is obtained from the Rx FIFO. If the packet is 
validated its MAC address is passed on to the Data Path 
Processor to MAC updation. The IP source address and the 
port values obtained from the knock are also passed for Filter 
updation. 
 
D. ARP Processor 
ARP processor is responsible for providing replies to the ARP 
requests coming from other hosts. This process is offloaded 
from the network stack to protect the latter from various layer 
 
 
Figure 5 : Block diagram showing architecture of the 
firmware 
 
2 attacks. The ARP processor uses the MAC address and IP 
address of the machine to create the ARP reply packet. The 
MAC address is hardwired and the IP address is obtained from 
the host PC during initialization. 
 
E. Packet Filter 
 
Packet Filter consists of a Packet Parser and a Filter Table. 
The default policy of the filter is to drop all packets coming to 
it. Packets that get a hit in the table are allowed to pass 
through. The table consists of the <IP source address, Source 
port number> vector. 
  
F. Host Interface 
 
Host interface is provided through a PCI Master/Target 
controller. The controller provides a 32 bit 33 MHz interface 
to the host machine. The internal address space is made 
available to the host through a set of Base Address Registers.  
  
V RELATED WORK 
 
Sebatian in his thesis [17] on “Analysis of port knocking and 
Single Packet Authorisation” analyses the port knocking 
mechanism and single packet authorization. He assessed their 
suitability for firewall authentication mechanism for opening 
network ports. He also discusses the threats against port 
knocking. In [18], the author discusses an extension of port 
knocking mechanism called “Port hopping” based on the idea 
of Spread Spectrum frequency hopping. 
Enhancing host based network security has been the subject of 
[19], [20] and [21], where the authors have used PCI based 
cards to improve the performance of existing software 
solutions. 
 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Despite many research and development efforts in the area of 
network security, it appears that the importance of data link 
layer security is still underestimated.  
 
This paper presents a feasible solution to the problem of 
network security focusing on data link layer. The fundamental 
problems faced at the data link layer were discussed. It was 
shown that there is significant benefit by implementing 
security mechanisms at the data link layer. This considerably 
reduces the code execution path for most transactions thereby 
minimizing the attack vulnerability of the system. The said 
mechanisms were implemented in hardware and incorporated 
in a programmable network interface card.  
 
However it is worth mentioning that there are a number of 
issues in the system that requires further considerations – like 
encryption and key management which are beyond the scope 
of this paper. These issues form the future work on the 
improvement and enhancement of the present implementation. 
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